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1699 
NIGHT OF THE LIVING DEAD HAND:  THE 
INDIVIDUAL MANDATE AND THE 
ZOMBIE CONSTITUTION 
Gary Lawson* 
INTRODUCTION 
If someone had told me on June 27, 2012, that five Justices of the U.S. 
Supreme Court were about to hold in National Federation of Independent 
Business v. Sebelius1 (NFIB) that the individual mandate provision in the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act2 (PPACA) was not 
constitutionally authorized either by the Commerce Clause or the Necessary 
and Proper Clause,3 I would have popped a cork.  I don’t even drink, but I 
would have popped the cork on principle just to hear the sound (and also to 
irritate my colleagues, most of whom revere the PPACA the way that cargo 
cultists revere airstrips4).  I would have thought it obvious that such a 
holding would entail invalidation of the mandate; and while that would not 
necessarily have rid the world of the statute in its entirety, absent five solid 
votes for nonseverability, it would have been—as the old joke says of 
10,000 lawyers at the bottom of the Atlantic—a good start. 
Of course, I would have been wrong on pretty much every possible level 
(except in believing that invalidation of the mandate would have been a 
 
*  Philip S. Beck Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. 
 1. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 2. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (to be codified primarily in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).  Section 1501(b) of the PPACA mandates that “[a]n 
applicable individual shall for each month beginning after 2013 ensure that the individual, 
and any dependent of the individual who is an applicable individual, is covered under 
minimum essential [health insurance] coverage for such month” or else face a monetary 
“penalty.” § 1501(b), 124 Stat. at 244 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a)–(b)(1)).  
There are exceptions for prisoners and some members of narrowly defined religious 
communities. § 1501(b), 124 Stat. at 246 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(d)(2)–(4)).  
The criteria for “minimum essential coverage” are defined in section 1501(b), 124 Stat. at 
248 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(f)). 
 3. If one judges by founding-era usage, the correct name for Article I, Section 8, Clause 
18 of the Constitution is the Sweeping Clause. See Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The 
“Proper” Scope of Federal Power:  A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 
43 DUKE L.J. 267, 270 (1993).  But because this Essay discusses a Supreme Court opinion 
that uses the (incorrect) modern label, I reluctantly defer to modernity’s error and call it the 
Necessary and Proper Clause. 
 4. Is the cargo cult comparison unkind to supporters of the PPACA?  Perhaps, though I 
am still waiting for someone to explain, without invoking magical thinking, how the PPACA 
will increase the supply of medical services. 
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good start, but that is a topic for another paper).  Halfway through Chief 
Justice Roberts’s opinion, the mandate was essentially pronounced dead.  
But like young Victor reviving the deceased Frankenweenie, Chief Justice 
Roberts resurrected the mandate from the grave by calling it an indirect tax.  
The operation was successful, but the patient unfortunately lived. 
The decision’s doctrinal consequences are difficult to gauge.  First, the 
holding that the individual mandate was constitutionally justifiable under 
Congress’s taxing power gives a very broad interpretation to the concept of 
an indirect tax, but it is hard to see where that will lead in future cases.  
Second, although the Supreme Court upheld most of the Act, it 
invalidated—by a 7–2 vote—the provisions that would have forced states 
dramatically to expand their Medicaid benefits.  If the goal of supporters of 
the PPACA was to increase in a substantial way the number of persons 
nominally covered by some form of health insurance, Medicaid expansion 
was a critical vehicle for achieving that goal, and it has now lost at least 
some of its wheels.  Both in the long and short term, that may be NFIB’s 
most consequential holding.5  Third, the holding that neither the Commerce 
Clause nor the Necessary and Proper Clause (nor the two in combination) 
could justify the mandate6 may or may not survive the next vacancy on the 
Supreme Court, so future predictions of doctrinal development are 
treacherous at best. 
Accordingly, I will focus only on the present and discuss “The Good, the 
Bad, and the Ugly” aspects of the Court’s holdings on the Commerce and 
Necessary and Proper Clauses, on the assumption that they represent good 
doctrine at least for the moment.7  The “good” is that the Court, for the first 
time in nearly two centuries, explicitly recognized that one of the central 
requirements of legislation under the Necessary and Proper Clause is that it 
must be “incidental” to some principal enumerated power.  This is an 
enormously important development that is entirely correct as a matter of 
 
 5. For an analysis of the Medicaid holding and its possible consequences, see Nicole 
Huberfeld, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard & Kevin Outterson, Plunging into Endless Difficulties:  
Medicaid and Coercion in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 93 B.U. 
L. REV. 1 (2013). 
 6. A number of sore winners persist in maintaining that the Court’s decisions on the 
Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause were dicta, because Chief Justice 
Roberts decided the case on other grounds.  But Chief Justice Roberts made it inescapably 
clear that the mandate could only be considered a tax if it could not be sustained as a 
regulatory penalty. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2600–01.  That is, if the Commerce Clause 
and/or Necessary and Proper Clause could sustain the mandate, then Chief Justice Roberts 
would have interpreted it as a regulatory penalty, which it most naturally appears to be.  He 
would only consider it to be a tax once a very strong doctrine of constitutional avoidance 
kicked into play, and that avoidance doctrine needed holdings on the Commerce Clause and 
Necessary and Proper Clause as triggers.  In Chief Justice Roberts’s eyes, the mandate 
literally did not become a tax, capable of being sustained by the taxing power, until he had 
finished his analysis of the Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause.  This 
reasoning may well be spectacularly silly, and even unconstitutional, see infra Conclusion, 
but it is not dicta. 
 7. I will touch only in passing on the decisive holding regarding the federal taxing 
power. 
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original meaning.  The “bad” is that the Court spent much of its energy 
discussing the Commerce Clause, which, in a rational world, could not be 
invoked as support for the mandate with a straight face.  While the Court 
avoided adopting an even sillier interpretation of the Commerce Clause 
than modern law has already generated, it missed an excellent opportunity 
to clarify the respective roles of the Commerce Clause and the Necessary 
and Proper Clause in the constitutional structure.  The “ugly” was the string 
of propositions that the Court took for granted as starting points for analysis 
regarding federal power.  Those propositions depart so far from any 
plausible understanding of the Constitution that it is a mistake in principle 
to describe the activity in which the Court was engaged as constitutional 
interpretation.  Something was being interpreted, but that something was 
not the actual Constitution.  Instead, it was a soulless shadow of the real 
document:  a zombie constitution.  Of course, that zombie constitution 
replaced the real one a long time ago (so perhaps Invasion of the Body 
Snatchers would have been a more apt reference); NFIB breaks no new 
ground on that score.  But the decision does highlight, if highlighting is 
necessary, the irrelevance of the actual Constitution to modern governance. 
I.  THE GOOD:  THE OBAMACARE INCIDENT 
The individual mandate was defended in the Supreme Court8 on three 
separate grounds:  as a valid exercise of Congress’s power (1) to “regulate 
Commerce . . . among the several States”; (2) to enact laws “necessary and 
proper for carrying into Execution” other federal powers, such as the 
commerce power; and (3) to “lay . . . Taxes.”9  Although the Court upheld 
the mandate on the third ground, from an interpretative standpoint the most 
noteworthy discussion concerned the second ground.  Five Justices, in two 
separate opinions, concluded that the Necessary and Proper Clause did not 
provide constitutional authorization for the mandate.  Both opinions 
advance important propositions about the Necessary and Proper Clause.10 
 
 8. This is not to say that it could not be, or was not, defended on other grounds.  For 
example, it would be difficult, and probably counterproductive, to try to pigeonhole Sotirios 
Barber’s defense of the PPACA, grounded on a teleological understanding of the 
Constitution, into one of the three clause-bound arguments made to the Court. See SOTIRIOS 
A. BARBER, THE FALLACIES OF STATES’ RIGHTS 24–29 (2012). 
 9. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2578–79. 
 10. Given the conventions of the legal academy, and my own general rejection of those 
conventions, I should note that I do not regard an idea’s appearance in a Supreme Court 
decision as evidence either for or against its merit.  The Constitution means whatever it 
means, and the Supreme Court, as with anyone else, can either acknowledge or fail to 
acknowledge that meaning.  There is no particular reason, either theoretical or empirical, to 
think that it will be any better at discerning that meaning than anyone else—and considerable 
reason to think that it will be worse in many contexts.  Furthermore, to celebrate a correct 
idea’s recognition by the Supreme Court presupposes that it is a good thing for the Supreme 
Court to recognize correct interpretations of the Constitution.  That may seem trivially true, 
but hopefully a moment’s reflection will show that such a claim can responsibly be defended 
only after elaboration of a foundationally sound moral theory that yields adjudicative fidelity 
to the Constitution as a derivative conclusion—and that is far from trivial.  Consider this 
Essay a piece of legal anthropology that simply observes, with contingent interest, the 
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The joint opinion for Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito (joint 
opinion) contained a brief but powerful discussion of the Clause.  After 
determining that the Commerce Clause could not justify the mandate—a 
determination about which I will say more in Part II—the joint opinion 
noted that “the Commerce Clause, even when supplemented by the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, is not carte blanche for doing whatever will 
help achieve the ends Congress seeks by the regulation of commerce.”11  
This conclusion followed a discussion of four prior cases, the first two of 
which—New York v. United States12 and Printz v. United States13—
involved regulation of states and the second two of which—United States v. 
Lopez14 and United States v. Morrison15—involved regulation of private 
activity.  The opinion then observed that “the last two of these cases show 
that the scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause is exceeded not only 
when the congressional action directly violates the sovereignty of the States 
but also when it violates the background principle of enumerated (and 
hence limited) federal power.”16 
While the opinion is a bit cryptic, a straightforward meaning emerges 
when one reflects on what it means to say that the Necessary and Proper 
Clause reflects “background principle[s].”  In Printz, the Court rejected the 
idea that the Necessary and Proper Clause could allow Congress to 
commandeer state officials to execute federal law because “[w]hen a ‘La[w] 
. . . for carrying into Execution’ the Commerce Clause violates the principle 
of state sovereignty . . . ,  it is not a ‘La[w] . . . proper for carrying into 
Execution the Commerce Clause.’”17  In support, the opinion cited a law 
review article that carefully, and one might even say eloquently,18 
explained how the word “proper” in the Necessary and Proper Clause 
incorporates background principles of separation of powers, federalism, and 
the rights of citizens as limits on the extent of the powers granted to 
Congress under the Clause.19  It is not enough for a law under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause to have an appropriate causal connection to 
effectuating an enumerated federal power.20  The Clause requires such laws 
 
Supreme Court’s recognition of certain constitutional truths and its utter failure to notice 
others, without attempting to ascribe normative weight to that recognition. 
 11. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2646. 
 12. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 13. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 14. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 15. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 16. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2646. 
 17. Printz, 521 U.S. at 923–24 (emphasis in original). 
 18. Of course, one might be less inclined to say this if one were not the article’s 
coauthor, but never mind. 
 19. See Lawson & Granger, supra note 3. 
 20. What is that appropriate causal connection?  Modern law appears to say “rational 
basis.” See United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956–57 (2010); Sabri v. United 
States, 541 U.S. 600, 605 (2004).  As usual, modern law is wildly wrong. See Gary Lawson, 
Discretion As Delegation:  The “Proper” Understanding of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 73 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235, 242–48 (2005) (arguing that “necessary” describes a causal 
connection stronger than rational basis but weaker than strict indispensability). 
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to be both “necessary” and “proper,” in the conjunctive, and the best 
understanding of “proper” is that it incorporates basic fiduciary norms, 
including the norm that agents (in this case Congress) must stay within the 
reasonable confines of their delegated authority.21  Those confines are 
determined as much by the nature and structure of the grants of power as by 
explicit limitations on the agent.  Printz was an eminently correct 
recognition of this basic feature of the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
Until NFIB, the only instances in which the Court expressly applied this 
understanding of the Necessary and Proper Clause involved direct 
regulation of states or state officials, as Justice Ginsburg accurately noted in 
her opinion for four Justices.22  The joint opinion makes clear that at least 
four Justices do not see the word “proper” as limiting the scope of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause only when some notion of “state sovereignty” 
is at issue.  Rather, a “proper” law must conform to all principles that 
define the appropriate reach of federal power.  While Lopez and Morrison 
did not expressly invoke this reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 
the joint opinion clarifies that such a reading was implicit in and underlies 
those decisions. 
Or so at least four Justices think.  What about Chief Justice Roberts?  The 
Chief Justice’s separate opinion agreed with the joint opinion that, “[e]ven 
if the individual mandate is ‘necessary’ to the [PPACA’s] insurance 
reforms, such an expansion of federal power is not a ‘proper’ means for 
making those reforms effective,”23 because laws under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause are not “proper” when those laws “undermine the structure of 
government established by the Constitution.”24  That makes five Justices 
who got it right. 
But Chief Justice Roberts got something else right that is even more 
fundamental than the limiting role played in the Constitution by the 
requirement that executory laws be “proper.”  At the outset of his 
discussion of the Necessary and Proper Clause, Chief Justice Roberts laid 
out some general principles that guide interpretation of the Clause: 
 The power to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for 
carrying into Execution” the powers enumerated in the Constitution, Art. 
I, § 8, cl. 18, vests Congress with authority to enact provisions “incidental 
to the [enumerated] power, and conducive to its beneficial exercise.”  
Although the Clause gives Congress authority to “legislate on that vast 
mass of incidental powers which must be involved in the constitution,” it 
 
 21. For more on the fiduciary roots of the Necessary and Proper Clause, see infra pp. 
1705–06. 
 22. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2626–27 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the 
judgment in part, and dissenting in part). 
 23. Id. at 2592. 
 24. Id. 
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does not license the exercise of any “great substantive and independent 
power[s]” beyond those specifically enumerated.25 
This is strange-sounding language to modern ears.  What does it mean to 
speak of a “great substantive and independent power” that is beyond the 
compass of the Necessary and Proper Clause?  And what is an “incidental” 
power?  When is an exercise of authority “incidental” to some enumerated 
power? 
It is in some respects sobering that this language is largely unfamiliar in 
modern times, because it was crucial to Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in 
McCulloch v. Maryland, from which it is drawn.  McCulloch is presumably 
taught in every Constitutional Law course, so how could this language and 
its significance escape notice?  Nonetheless, escape notice it has.  Indeed, 
the present author is moderately ashamed to admit that he did not 
understand the import of this language until a few short years ago, when it 
was made clear to him by Robert Natelson, who to my knowledge is the 
only modern scholar who has truly understood the role of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause in the constitutional design.26 
Fortunately, Mr. Natelson was available to coauthor a brief in NFIB that 
pointed out to the Court this language’s importance.27  Recall that 
McCulloch involved the constitutionality of federal incorporation of a 
national bank, in the absence of express constitutional provisions 
authorizing either federal banks or federal corporations.28 The enduring 
legacy of McCulloch is its discussion of the meaning of the word 
“necessary,” in which the Court rejected the strict Jeffersonian construction 
of the term in favor of some looser construction.29  (Whether that looser 
construction was or was not the Hamiltonian “rational basis” test of modern 
law is a topic for another time.)  But before engaging in that discussion, 
Chief Justice Marshall devoted seven pages to what he recognized was a 
 
 25. Id. at 2591 (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (citing McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 411, 418, 421 (1819)). 
 26. And I say that as someone who has spent much of his professional life studying the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.  I think I managed to blunder into some right answers along 
the way, but without Rob Natelson’s insights, first laid out systematically in Robert G. 
Natelson, The Agency Law Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 55 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 243 (2004), I would have missed the most central feature of the Clause.  I do, however, 
give myself credit for being a fast learner. See Gary Lawson & David B. Kopel, Bad News 
for Professor Koppelman:  The Incidental Unconstitutionality of the Individual Mandate, 
121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 267 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/1025.pdf. 
 27. See Brief of Authors of The Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause (Gary 
Lawson, Robert G. Natelson & Guy Seidman) and the Independence Institute As Amici 
Curiae in Support of Respondents (Minimum Coverage Provision), Dep’t. of Health & 
Human Servs. v. Florida, No. 11-398 (U.S. Feb. 13, 2012), 2012 WL 484061.  Chief Justice 
Roberts did not cite this brief, in keeping with his general reluctance to cite secondary 
literature.  We (meaning the authors of the brief) would like to think that it provided the 
inspiration for his discussion of the Necessary and Proper Clause, but we may never know.  
It is hard to believe, however, that by sheer coincidence Chief Justice Roberts independently 
rediscovered the principal/incident language from McCulloch just as we filed the brief. 
 28. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 318–19 (1819). 
 29. Id. at 322–26. 
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question preliminary to a discussion of causal necessity:  whether 
establishment of a federal corporation was properly an incident to any of the 
enumerated powers.30  As Marshall explained, incorporation was “not, like 
the power of making war, or levying taxes, or of regulating commerce, a 
great substantive and independent power, which cannot be implied as 
incidental to other powers.”31  Rather, incorporation of a bank “must be 
considered as a means not less usual, not of higher dignity, not more 
requiring a particular specification than other means.”32  Therefore the 
power of incorporation may “pass as incidental to those powers which are 
expressly given, if it be a direct mode of executing them.”33 
The key to this passage is understanding that the Necessary and Proper 
Clause is an expression of basic principles of agency law, well understood 
by the framing public (and particularly by the agency lawyers on the 
Committee of Detail who drafted the Clause).  Any agency instrument will 
grant certain powers to the agent.  Because it is difficult or costly to specify 
every possible contingency that can arise, it is sensible to construe agency 
instruments, unless otherwise specified by the drafters, to allow the agent to 
exercise powers that regularly accompany, or are incidental to, the 
specifically enumerated, or principal, powers granted by the instrument.   
For example, an agent’s power to enter into contracts might well include, 
depending on the context and the custom in the trade, the power to extend 
credit to the purchaser on behalf of the principal, even if the agency 
instrument makes no mention of credit sales.  Eighteenth-century agency 
law so held.  But these implications of ancillary, or incidental, powers have 
limits; the agent with authority to enter contracts might be able to imply a 
power to extend credit if that was customary among such agents, but it 
would be a very different matter to imply a power to sell the principal’s 
entire business—even for a good price.  The power to sell the business is 
surely a principal power in that context, meaning that one would expect it to 
be specifically enumerated in the agency instrument if it existed.  It would 
not be an ordinary accompaniment, or incident, of the agent’s power to sell 
goods. 
By the late eighteenth century, there was a thick body of law governing 
what kinds of powers in various contexts were properly incidents to the 
powers of an agent.  These understandings could, of course, be altered, 
abolished, or codified by the parties in the drafting of their instruments.  If 
one wanted an instrument in which the agent had broader incidental powers 
than the background law would provide, one could draft an “implied 
powers” clause that would suggest broader-than-background authority.  Or 
one could negate any inference of incidental powers by specifying that the 
agent had only those powers expressly granted. Or one could essentially 
codify the background norms by providing that agents may exercise all 
 
 30. Id. at 405–11. 
 31. Id. at 411. 
 32. Id. at 421. 
 33. Id. at 411.  
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“necessary,” “proper,” or (most restrictively of all within the range of 
background conventions) “necessary and proper” powers to execute the 
granted powers. 
Robert Natelson has demonstrated—beyond a reasonable doubt, I will 
unhesitatingly aver—that the Necessary and Proper Clause was precisely 
such an “implied powers” clause drawn from these principles of agency 
law.34  Accordingly, Congress (the agent) has only those unexpressed, 
unenumerated powers that are incident to the specified, or principal, 
enumerated powers.  Importantly, status as an incident is a precondition for 
a power’s inclusion under the Necessary and Proper Clause, which status 
must be established before one asks whether the power is somehow causally 
related to the execution of some enumerated power.  If the exercised power 
is really a principal rather than incidental power, then it cannot come within 
the Necessary and Proper Clause no matter how causally efficacious it 
might be.  That is why Chief Justice Marshall, after determining that the 
power of incorporation was incidental rather than principal, concluded that 
incorporation could “pass as incidental to those powers which are expressly 
given, if it be a direct mode of executing them.”35  The requirement that the 
power be an incident was in addition to the requirement that it be a direct 
mode of (“necessary” for) effectuating the principal (“expressly given”) 
powers. 
In the context of the individual mandate, this means that a threshold 
question, before one asks whether the law is “necessary and proper for 
carrying into Execution” some enumerated power, is whether the power 
represented by the mandate is incidental or principal.  If it is the latter, then 
Congress cannot exercise such a power without a constitutional amendment 
adding it to the express, principal powers of Congress.  The power to order 
people to buy products (and to buy them from government-approved 
monopolists in the bargain) is at worst arguably, and at most blindingly 
obviously, a principal power, of at least equal “dignity” (as eighteenth-
century agency law described the principal/incident inquiry) to the express 
powers of the national government.  Chief Justice Roberts accordingly 
concluded that the mandate could not be “‘incidental’ to the exercise of the 
commerce power.  Rather, such a conception of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause would work a substantial expansion of federal authority.”36 
The short-term consequence of Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion is to 
bring to the forefront the agency-law origins of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause and the importance of determining, as a threshold matter, whether 
any claimed exercise of congressional authority under that Clause seeks to 
exercise a principal rather than incidental power.  This is not a new idea; it 
 
 34. See, e.g., Robert G. Natelson, The Legal Origins of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, in GARY LAWSON, GEOFFREY P. MILLER, ROBERT G. NATELSON & GUY I. SEIDMAN, 
THE ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE 52 (2010); Robert G. Natelson, The 
Framing and Adoption of the Necessary and Proper Clause, in LAWSON ET AL., supra, at 84. 
 35. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 411 (emphasis added). 
 36. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2592 (2012) (citing McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 418)). 
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was the foundation for the opinion in McCulloch.  But it is an incredibly 
important idea that was in danger of getting lost.  The long-term 
consequence is to stimulate consideration of the many ways in which 
agency law can inform understanding of the Constitution, beyond the 
narrow confines of the PPACA.  Time will tell if that turns out to be Chief 
Justice Roberts’s most important contribution to American jurisprudence. 
II.  THE BAD:  MISSED IT BY THAT MUCH 
Putting together Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion and the four-Justice joint 
opinion, NFIB represents the high-water mark in modern jurisprudence37 in 
recognizing the original meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause.  The 
decisions, alas, did not fare so well with respect to the Commerce Clause.  
It is true that Chief Justice Roberts and the four authors of the joint opinion 
rejected the claim that the Commerce Clause could authorize the mandate, 
and that is certainly correct as a matter of original meaning.  But they 
missed an opportunity to clarify modern law in a conceptually important 
way, and it is unlikely that a better opportunity will arise in the near future.  
What failed to happen is, in the long run, probably more important than 
what happened. 
The individual mandate compels virtually all Americans to purchase 
government-approved health insurance or pay a fine.38  The Commerce 
Clause gives Congress power to “regulate Commerce . . . among the several 
States.”39  It took both Chief Justice Roberts and the joint opinion a fair 
amount of time and effort, and a discussion of a great many past decisions, 
to reach the conclusion that the Commerce Clause does not provide 
constitutional authority for the mandate.  With all due respect, this is a 
conclusion that does not require much in the way of either effort or thought. 
The mandate makes it unlawful to sit in your living room (perhaps 
contemplating your navel or watching paint dry) while uninsured.  There is 
no linguistically defensible way to describe this as a regulation of 
“Commerce . . . among the several States.”  Sitting in your living room is 
not commerce—not among states, with foreign nations, with Indian tribes, 
or even with your bridge club.  If someone honestly, truly believes that 
sitting in your living room is actually “Commerce” as that word is used in 
the Constitution,40 I genuinely do not know what to say to them—just as I 
 
 37. To be sure, that is somewhat like talking about the high-water mark in the Gobi 
Desert, but one takes what one can get. 
 38. It is a fine.  It does not become a tax instead of a fine simply because the Supreme 
Court calls it one, no more than the word “proper” imposes a jurisdictional limitation on 
Congress simply because the Supreme Court says that it does.  Reality is objective; its 
existence does not depend on some Berkeleyan perception by the Supreme Court. 
 39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 40. The qualifying phrase “as that word is used in the Constitution” is vital.  It is 
possible to come up with meanings for the word “commerce” that encompass all human 
activity, and even all human inactivity.  It is much harder to say that those meanings found 
their way into Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of a late-eighteenth-century legal document. See 
Robert G. Natelson & David Kopel, Commerce in the Commerce Clause:  A Response to 
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would not know what to say to someone who honestly, truly believes that 
growing plants in your kitchen window is commerce.  There are times when 
argument is not worth the effort. 
To be sure, sitting in your living room uninsured (or growing plants in 
your kitchen window) might well affect commerce among the several states 
(or with foreign nations, or with the Indian tribes) in some fashion, however 
remote.  But the Commerce Clause does not give Congress power to 
regulate matters that affect commerce (remotely or otherwise); it gives 
Congress power to regulate (some forms of) commerce.  If the subject 
matter being regulated is not commerce, it does not come within the Clause.  
Activities that are not commerce but that affect commerce are not 
commerce; they are activities that affect commerce but are not commerce.  
At the risk of offending someone, and perhaps a great many someones:  this 
is so simple a point that it requires a willful act to miss it. 
That is not to say that the Constitution does not authorize Congress to 
regulate activities that are not themselves commerce but that affect 
commerce. It is only to say that the Commerce Clause cannot, with a 
straight face, be put forward as the source of that authority.  As it happens, 
there is a clause in the Constitution that seems well suited to addressing the 
things-that-are-not-commerce-but-which-might-affect-commerce situation.  
Congress is given power to make “all Laws which shall be necessary and 
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers,”41 including the 
power to regulate commerce among the several states.  If a power to 
regulate something other than interstate commerce is (1) incidental to that 
power and (2) necessary and proper for carrying that power into execution, 
then the Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes Congress to regulate that 
noninterstate-commerce-but-interstate-commerce-affecting activity.  But 
the constitutional analysis must center on the Necessary and Proper Clause, 
not the Commerce Clause. 
Modern law, of course, has lost this elementary understanding.  Cases 
routinely describe as part of the commerce power itself the ability to 
regulate matters that have a “substantial effect”42 on interstate commerce.43  
This is just sloppy thinking (and writing) that skips an essential step in the 
analysis:  Congress may well be able to regulate noninterstate-commerce 
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce, but only under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause (and consistent with all of the limitations on 
the scope of the power granted by that Clause), not under the Commerce 
 
Jack Balkin, 109 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 55 (2010), http://www.michigan
lawreview.org/assets/fi/109/natelsonkopel.pdf; see also Robert G. Natelson, The Legal 
Meaning of “Commerce” in the Commerce Clause, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 789 (2006). 
 41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 42. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 119 (1941).  This is not to say that the 
decision in Darby committed this error.  It committed many other errors, but not this one. 
 43. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995). 
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Clause itself.  I have made this point at length elsewhere44 and will not 
belabor it here. 
This confusion is certainly not new to NFIB, but the individual mandate 
presented such a clear illustration of the absurdity of trying to treat as 
“commerce . . . among the several States” activities (and I am treating 
sitting in your living room watching paint dry as an activity) that simply 
cannot be jackhammered into that conceptual category.  It is hard to 
imagine a more appropriate case in which to clear up this particular 
confusion.  It is a bit depressing that no one, not even Justice Scalia,45 
thought to mention it. 
III.  THE UGLY:  RESIDENT EVIL 
The individual mandate is actually a rather modest piece of the larger 
PPACA.  Indeed, the mandate is a means for implementing some of the 
statute’s broader provisions; no one, to my knowledge, views the mandate 
as a desirable end in itself.  Rather, the mandate is a response to some 
consequences of the PPACA’s regulation of the insurance market, which in 
its most basic form specifies the minimum content of health insurance 
policies, forbids insurers from denying coverage to persons with pre-
existing conditions, and forbids most price differentiation among persons 
who present varying risk profiles.46  Another major chunk of the PPACA 
involves spending large amounts of money, either as grants to states for 
Medicaid services or to private individuals to subsidize their purchase of 
health insurance. 
No one in NFIB challenged the constitutional authority of Congress to 
regulate the terms and content of private insurance contracts.  Nor did 
anyone challenge the basic constitutional propriety of Medicaid as a 
spending program or the federal subsidization of private purchases of health 
insurance—though of course there were (successful) challenges to some 
provisions compelling states to expand their Medicaid programs or lose all 
federal funding.  Congress’s powers to regulate insurance and to transfer 
wealth from some citizens to others as an end in itself unconnected to the 
implementation of some enumerated federal power were simply taken for 
granted.  Those matters have been deemed settled since the New Deal,47 
 
 44. See Gary Lawson & David B. Kopel, The PPACA in Wonderland, 38 AM J. L. & 
MED. 269, 281–84 (2012). 
 45. At other times, Justice Scalia has recognized the appropriate role of the Necessary 
and Proper Clause in this kind of analysis. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 33–35 (2005) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 46. In other words, it essentially forbids insurance from functioning as insurance and 
instead turns it into a privately administered welfare program.  A detailed account of the 
PPACA’s insurance regulations, and a detailed defense of my characterization of those 
provisions, would require a separate article, which I am quite sure will never get written. 
 47. On congressional power to regulate insurance, see United States v. South-Eastern 
Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).  On congressional power to spend without 
reference to the implementation of enumerated powers, see United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 
77–78 (1936), and Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937). 
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and they were the foundation upon which all of the opinions and arguments 
in NFIB were fashioned. 
Of course, Congress has no such powers under the Constitution.  The 
formation and terms of an insurance contract are not remotely matters 
within the reach of the Commerce Clause, as the Supreme Court recognized 
for a century and a half before the New Deal.48  Nor does Congress have an 
unlimited power to spend money, without reference to whether the spending 
carries into execution some enumerated power.  The Constitution’s only 
“spending clause” is in fact the Necessary and Proper Clause, which 
requires that any appropriation law be “necessary and proper for carrying 
into Execution” some enumerated federal power.49  The vast bulk of the 
PPACA is, if anything, more flagrantly unconstitutional than the individual 
mandate.  But the debate over the mandate took place in a legal world in 
which a taxing clause becomes a spending clause and the formation of a 
contract is interstate commerce.  This is not a legal world governed by the 
U.S. Constitution. 
The point is simple but profound:  when the Supreme Court was deciding 
on the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, the Commerce Clause, 
and the Taxing Clause in NFIB, it was not actually interpreting the U.S. 
Constitution.  It was interpreting a document that bears some facial 
resemblance to the U.S. Constitution but that functions as a completely 
different instrument.  The specific clauses at issue in NFIB do not have 
meanings in the abstract.  They have meanings in the context of a particular 
document.  If one put the text of the Necessary and Proper Clause in an 
Olive Garden menu, it would not necessarily bear the same meaning that it 
has in Article I, Section 8, Clause 18 of the Constitution of 1788; in the 
former case, for example, it would not be obvious that the clause was 
drawing its meaning from background principles of agency law.  Once one 
has abandoned the Constitution on such fundamental matters as the federal 
spending power and the scope of interstate commerce (and these are just 
two of the countless matters on which modern law deviates so far from 
original meaning that it makes no sense to describe the relevant ascription 
 
 48. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 183 (1868).  For detailed accounts of 
why South-Eastern Underwriters is egregiously wrong as a matter of original meaning, see 
Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People:  Why the Individual Health Insurance 
Mandate Is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 581, 585–86 (2010); Robert G. 
Natelson & David B. Kopel, “Health Laws of Every Description”:  John Marshall’s Ruling 
on a Federal Health Care Law, 12 ENGAGE 49, 50–51 (2011); Rob Natelson & David Kopel, 
Health Insurance Is Not “Commerce,” NAT’L L.J. (Mar. 28, 2011), http://www.law.com/
jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202487886015. 
 49. For detailed accounts of why the federal spending power is located in the Necessary 
and Proper Clause rather than (as modern law would have it) in a clause that grants only the 
power to tax, see GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE:  
TERRITORIAL EXPANSION & AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 24–32 (2004), and Jeffrey T. Renz, 
What Spending Clause? (Or the President’s Paramour):  An Examination of the Views of 
Hamilton, Madison, and Story on Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 of the United States 
Constitution, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 81 (1999). 
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of meaning to the resulting instrument as “constitutional interpretation”), 
one might as well be “interpreting” the Olive Garden menu.   
Indeed, such interpretation would be far less prone to the fallacy of 
equivocation, in which one surreptitiously (and perhaps unthinkingly) 
substitutes the real Constitution for the instrument actually being interpreted 
in the premise or conclusion of an argument.  This is a serious risk because, 
as noted above, the instrument that is the object of interpretation bears some 
vague, cursory resemblance to the actual Constitution.  But in reality, it is a 
shadow, or zombie form, of the actual Constitution.  It takes the external 
appearance, or body, of the Constitution, but with the Constitution’s actual 
meaning drained from that body.  Like a zombie, this faux Constitution 
shambles onward, eating people’s brains whenever it can get past their 
defenses, while utterly lacking the soul (that is, the meaning) that defines 
the actual Constitution. 
This is not something unique to NFIB.  The entirety of modern 
constitutional jurisprudence consists of treating a zombie constitution as 
though it were the real deal.  Nor is it a new point; I made the same 
observation two decades ago.50  At the time, I had nothing much to offer 
beyond the observation, and I have nothing better today.  But the shared 
premises of all of the parties and all of the Justices in NFIB bring home 
with clarity that almost no one today engages in real constitutional 
interpretation.  That does not mean that the vast bulk of academics, and the 
entire legal profession and judiciary, are not engaged in important and 
interesting activities.  From the standpoint of political theory, either 
normative or descriptive, those activities are far more interesting and 
important than interpreting the Constitution.  It does not even mean that 
those persons are not engaged in some kind of interpretation of some kind 
of “constitution”; the interpretation of a zombie constitution is most 
assuredly a species of constitutional interpretation.  It just means that they 
are not interpreting the Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
One final note while we are on the subject of “ugly.”  Chief Justice 
Roberts upheld the mandate only because he construed it to be a tax 
(specifically an indirect tax that required no apportionment among the 
states) and was therefore authorized by the taxing power.  That 
 
 50. See Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 
1231, 1253 (1994): 
It makes no sense to agonize over the correct application of, for example, the 
Appointments Clause, the Exceptions Clause, or even the First Amendment when 
principles as basic to the Constitution as enumerated powers and nondelegation are 
no longer considered part of the interpretative order.  What is left of the 
Constitution after excision of its structural provisions, however interesting it may 
be as a matter of normative political theory, simply is not the Constitution. 
Id. 
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construction, in turn, was driven by his belief that only such a construction 
of the law could save its constitutionality.  He explained: 
. . . [T]he statute reads more naturally as a command to buy insurance 
than as a tax, and I would uphold it as a command if the Constitution 
allowed it.  It is only because the Commerce Clause does not authorize 
such a command that it is necessary to reach the taxing power question.  
And it is only because we have a duty to construe a statute to save it, if 
fairly possible, that [the mandate] can be interpreted as a tax.  Without 
deciding the Commerce Clause question, I would find no basis to adopt 
such a saving construction.51 
The point of this discussion was to make it clear why he felt it necessary to 
address the Commerce Clause (and the Necessary and Proper Clause) even 
though he was ultimately upholding the mandate on the basis of the taxing 
power. 
As I read this passage, Chief Justice Roberts looked at the statute and 
saw a command and a penalty for violating that command—as did the four 
Justices in the joint opinion52 and as did I.53  He concluded that such a 
command/penalty was unconstitutional—as did the four Justices in the joint 
opinion and as did I.  He therefore re-read the statute, in a fashion that by 
his own lights does not represent its most plausible reading, as a tax, which 
he could then uphold. 
Let us assume that Chief Justice Roberts was right about the mandate 
being constitutional if it was construed as a tax.54  Is there any escape from 
the conclusion that Chief Justice Roberts just “upheld” a statute that, by his 
own lights, Congress did not enact?  To be sure, there is nothing unusual or 
unprecedented about the interpretative move made by Chief Justice Roberts.  
To the contrary, the avoidance canon, even in this statute-altering guise,55 is 
a well-recognized principle of interpretation.56  But that does not change its 
effect, which is to “uphold” a law that was not actually enacted.  So framed, 
application of this canon blatantly violates the Constitution’s lawmaking 
provisions57 and exceeds the scope of the “judicial Power.”58 
 
 51. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2600–01 (2012). 
 52. See id. at 2650–55. 
 53. See Lawson & Kopel, supra note 44, at 278–79. 
 54. I do not think he was right about that, see id. at 279–80, but it is a hard question 
about which I am far less certain than I am about the other matters discussed in this Essay.  I 
certainly would not say mean things about someone who maintains that the mandate, if 
properly considered a tax, is constitutional—especially if they have thought about the matter 
more carefully than I have. 
 55. Alternative versions of the avoidance canon would say to prefer an interpretation 
that does not raise constitutional questions to a comparably plausible interpretation that does 
raise such questions, see ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW:  THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 247–51 (2012), or to resolve cases on nonconstitutional 
grounds where possible. See id. at 251. 
 56. Gillian E. Metzger & Trevor W. Morrison, The Presumption of Constitutionality and 
the Individual Mandate , 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1717–20 (2013). 
 57. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 1–2. 
 58. Id. art. III, § 1. 
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Perhaps there is a way to understand the application of this particular 
interpretative device that does not involve the substitution of a new statute 
for the one that was actually enacted.  It is no proof against that possibility 
that I do not see it.  But I do not see it. 
